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ABSTRACT 
A new approach to the problem of assessing causality for adverse drug 
reactions is presented. The approach uses Bayes' Theorem to answer the 
causality assessment problem in a logically satisfying and nonarbitrary way. 
The posterior odds in favour of drug causation is obtained by multiplying the 
prior odds by likelihood ratio terms that describe the differential diagnostic 
content of five separate categories of information about the case: the 
history of the patient before the adverse event occurred; the timing of the 
adverse event; the characteristics of the adverse event; the effect of 
dechallenge; and the effect of rechallenge. Although much work remains to be 
done before the method can be easily implemented, the approach satisfies basic 
criteria for causality assessment methods, a claim that cannot be made for any 
other currently available technique. 
Key words: adverse drug reactions, 
coherence 
causality assessment, probability, 
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INTRODUCTION 
The answers to important clinical, research and policy questions can 
depend in part on the extent to which one is justified in believing that 
particular adverse clinical events were caused by specific drugs. For 
example, should a clinician discontinue the use of an effective anti-
inflammatory drug in a patient to whom it may be causing angina! pain? How 
should a pharmaceutical manufacturer react to the fact that two patients in a 
clinical trial of a new antiulcer drug developed liver disease? Should a 
trial of a new heart failure drug be terminated because four of nine patients 
on the drug died suddenly within the first three months of treatment? How 
should an epidemiologist studying the incidence of in-hospital iatrogenic 
diseases decide whether a particular case of renal failure is drug-induced? 
All these questions involve the causality assessment problem: given all 
the available information, what is the probability that a given adverse 
clinical event was caused by some particular drug to which the patient had 
been exposed? In a previous paper [ 1), two of us developed criteria that 
methods for solving the causality assessment problem should satisfy, and we 
argued that no current method satisfied these criteria. In this paper, we 
describe a new approach to the causality assessment problem, and we show that 
this approach satisfies the criteria discussed in [l). Ideas related to the 
new approach can be found in [ 2] and [ 3). The new approach is based on 
Bayesian probability theory. In Section A, we explain the essential ideas of 
this theory and present reasons why it should be applied in the causality 
assessment context. The new approach is described in Section B, and in 
Section C, it is discussed in relation to the criteria of [l] • 
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A. BAYES' THEOREM AND CAUSALITY ASSESSMENT 
Two features of the causality assessment problem contribute substantially 
to its difficulty. The first of these is uncertainty. The assessor is 
usually uncertain about many of the key elements he must integrate into his 
assessment. His uncertainty may be about some of the facts of the case (Did 
the patient actually take the drug before the adverse event began? Has the 
patient ever experienced a similar event before?); about background 
information that affects how these facts are to be interpreted (How long 
should it take before toxic quantities of the relevant metabolite of the drug 
have accumulated at the target organ? What is the incidence of events like 
this in patients similar to the present one, but who have not taken the 
suspected drug?); or about the assumptions that it is appropriate to make when 
determining the evidentiary significance of the clinical data (If the event is 
an adverse reaction to the suspected drug, is the mechanism dose-dependent or 
immunologic? Could the adverse event be a clinical sequela of the disease for 
which the patient is taking the drug as treatment?). Somehow, the assessor 
must take into account this uncertain information and the extent of his 
uncertainty when he evaluates the probability that the suspected drug caused 
the adverse event. 
The second feature is the complexity of the information that affects 
causality assessment. Several different factors are relevant to any causality 
assessment and the evidence about each of them usually comes from several 
different sources. The factors include background incidence of similar events 
( in patients who had previously taken the drug, as well as in those who had 
not), aspects of the patient's history ( including previous experience with 
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characteristics of the event (including drug levels in tissues or body 
fluids), and the patient's response to dechallenge (withdrawal of the drug) or 
rechallenge ( readministration of the drug), when these occur. Information 
sources include the assessor's previous clinical experience and his clinical 
judgment, clinical observations and laboratory findings on the patient in 
question, data from epidemiologic studies, as well as facts and theories from 
pharmacology and other basic sciences. Frequently, information from one 
source or about one factor conflicts with information from another source or 
about another factor. Even when the information is not mutually contra-
dictory, some way must be found to weight the significance of each piece of 
information and combine these .. weights of evidence" in a reasonable way. 
The difficulties described are not unique to the assessment of adverse 
drug reactions. They apply to the general problem of differential diagnosis 
in medicine. In assessing a possible adverse drug reaction, drug causation is 
simply one of the main .. diagnoses" being considered. The added difficulty 
that this entails arises because the main way that physicians usually solve 
differential diagnostic problems the performance of tests that help to 
distinguish between the various possible diagnoses - is usually not helpful 
for identifying adverse drug reactions. There ·are no good tests for drug 
causation. In the remainder of this section however, we will suggest that a 
generalization of the main strategy used for the interpretation of diagnostic 
tests -- Bayes' Theorem - also provides a solution to the problem of 
causality assessment in adverse drug reactions. 
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1. Bayes' Theorem 
As used for interpreting diagnostic tests [4] Bayes' Theorem uses 
information about the characteristics of the test (sensitivity, specificity 
etc.) and the prevalence of the disease in the population from which the 
patient came to interpret a particular test result. Thus for a positive test 
result: 
P(D IF) = 
D = Disease Present 
nc = Disease Absent 
r+ = Positive test result 
~(" = Conditional probability: 
P(D) x P("rlD) 
the probability of the proposition on 
the left of the " I" given that you accept the proposition on the 
right of "IO as true. 
The same formula can be used to determine P(ocli+), the probability that 
the patient does not have the disease: 
= 
These two results can be combined to calculate the odds that the patient 
has the disease (the ratio of the probabilities that the patient does and does 
not have the disease): 
6 
; 
; 
• 
= X 
Posterior odds prior odds x likelihood ratio. 
The odds form of Bayes' Theorem has a very attractive attribute: it 
describes the contribution of the diagnostic test result in a very simple way, 
the likelihood ratio. Examine the likelihood ratio formula. In words, it 
answers the question: How many times more likely would you be to see a 
positive test result if the disease was present compared with if it was 
absent? This can be rephrased in a more general way: how many times more 
likely would you be to see a particular finding if the disease was present 
compared with if it was absent? Also, we could change the phrase "if the 
disease was present ••• " to any other diagnostic proposition such as "if the 
drug was the cause of the adverse event compared with if something else caused 
it". Thus, in principle, the Bayesian formula can incorporate any data that 
helps discriminate between any diagnostic proposition and its alternative. 
The likelihood ratio formulation also makes it easy to see how the same method 
could incorporate information from many different sources. Each source of 
information would contribute a new likelihood ratio term that would transform 
a prior odds (prior to information about that factor) to a posterior odds 
( posterior to information about that factor). The posterior odds for the 
first factor would serve as a prior odds for the second factor and the process 
would continue until all of the relevant sources of information had been 
exhausted. 
Thus it is clear, in principle, how this approach could provide a 
solution to any complex differential diagnostic problem. In the adverse drug 
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reaction context each important finding of the case (history, timing, 
dechallenge, etc.) would contribute a likelihood ratio term that would express 
how much more (or less) likely that finding would be with drug versus other 
causation. The individual likelihood terms would then be combined with the 
prior odds of drug causation as described above to arrive at the probability 
(odds) that the drug caused the adverse event. 
However, application of the method appears to face an insurmountable 
problem: estimating the probabilities that make up the prior odds and like-
lihood ratio terms appears to require more data than we have or can ever hope 
to have. We ·believe that this view derives from a misunderstanding of what 
probability really means and why we measure it. 
2. Probability 
Consider why we measure probabilities in medicine. We measure probabi-
lities because they help us decide how to act when faced with uncertainty. We 
wish to know how likely the patient is to have a particular disease because 
that probability will determine whether or not we will treat him for it. The 
more likely it is that he has the disease the more likely we are to treat him 
as if he had it. Considered in this light probabilities measure our pro-
pensity to act as if the proposition that we are evaluating is true. 
The interpretation of probabilities as subjective measures of degree of 
belief that determine our propensity to act is not new. This is the central 
idea in the pioneering work of the Italian mathematician Bruno de Finetti 
[5,6]. De Finetti reduced the assessment of probability to an economic 
decision, where the act to be taken and the values of their consequences are 
clear. To understand how this works, evaluate the probability for you of a 
proposition A according to the following "thought experiment .. : decide upon a 
number p such that you are neutral between buying and selling for $pa ticket -
8 
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that will be worth $1 if A is true and otherwise it will be worth nothing. 
For any number greater than p, the price is too high, and you would be un-
willing to buy the ticket, while you would not agree to sell the ticket for 
less than p. This number p is your probability that A is true (You must 
imagine that at some specified time in the future, you will find out for sure 
whether A is or is not true). Note that if you are sure that A is true, p 
must be 1, and if you are sure that A is false, p must be zero; otherwise, 
there is a unique number p between O and 1 satisfying the definition. It may 
be difficult to determine p exactly, just as it is difficult to decide exactly 
how much you would be willing to pay for a new house. In principle however, 
both quantities exist, and, at the least, bounds on both could be determined 
by how you act when you bet, or when you negotiate for the house. 
3. Coherence 
With the de Finetti definition of probability, it is possible to give a 
precise meaning to consistent (and inconsistent) reasoning in the face of 
uncertainty. Suppose, as in the assessment of a suspected drug reaction, you 
simultaneously assess the uncertainty you feel about many different pro-
positions that are related in various ways. Using de Finetti's definition as 
your measure of uncertainty, you have simultaneously set the price for many 
tickets. Is it possible, in principle, that someone could transact with you 
for some of these, at your prices, in such a way that you must pay out more 
than you receive from him, no matter which of the propositions are true and 
which are false? If so, in your assessments you have in effect made economic 
decisions with unacceptable economic consequence, certain financial loss. The 
possibility of such loss is a concretization of the inconsistent reasoning 
that underlies it. 
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As a very simple example, suppose A represents the proposition that a 
patient will have a recurrence of an adverse drug reaction within 24 hours. of 
re-exposure to a suspected drug and Ac that he will not. There is nothing 
inherently wrong with assessing P(A) = 0.25, nor with assessing P(AC) = 0.25. 
On the other hand, it is clearly inconsistent to assess both quantities as 
0.25: if you did so, and sold tickets at the assessed prices, someone could 
buy one of each ticket for a total outlay of soi - and give them back to you 
today demanding $1 in return, since one or the other proposition is bound to 
be true tomorrow, and hence one of the tickets must be worth $1, while the 
other will be worth nothing. The so4 sure loss you ( the assessor) face in 
this situation reveals the inconsistency in the simultaneous assessments of 
0.2~ for the two probabilities P(A) and P(AC). 
A set of bets that makes money no matter what happens is called a Dutch 
book in gambling circles. The rules of prdbability theory (Appendix I) 
guarantee that all your probability assessments fit together in such a way 
that a Dutch book cannot be made against you. In this sense, you either 
reason about uncertainty consistently with these rules - or you act like 
someone who is willing to give money away without any chance of getting it 
back. And, since your probabilities for the various propositions exist 
whether you determine them or not, this result remains true whether you 
explicitly and quantitatively assess your uncertainty or you just do it 
implicitly and qualitatively,· as in most current approaches to causality 
assessment. A set of probability assessments that is consistent with the 
rules is called coherent, and any reasoning about uncertai~ty that is not con-
sistent with them is called incoherent. 
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4. Bayes' Theorem and Causality Assessment 
The de Finetti definition frees probability from its dependence on 
frequency information. All our uncertainties about interpretation of a case, 
informed by whatever facts, theories, or intuitions that we can bring to bear, 
~ be legitimately treated as probabilities and combined by· the rules of 
probability theory (from which Bayes' theorem is derived, see Appendix II) to 
decide on the probability of drug causation. More than that, the de Finetti 
definition of probability implies that we must do so if we wish to ensure that 
our overall assessment is coherent. 
A necessary step in this process must be to assign a number to each of our 
component uncertainties about the case. Many people may be uncomfortable with 
this idea. When asked, for example, what is the chance that a patient with a 
certain clinical condition treated in a particular way will experience some 
particular untoward clinical event in some specified time period, they will 
respond that they ju~t do not know. To attach a number to their uncertainty 
would be to introduce a meaningless quantification to something essentially 
vague and even unknowable. We believe that this position is incorrect, for 
the following three reasons: 
l) Using de Finetti's measure the quantification of uncertainty is not 
meaningless. There is certainly some justice in applying the charge of 
meaningless quantification to some previous approaches to causality assessment 
that have used uncalibrated, analogue probability-like scales ranging from 0 
to 1 (or 100) [7 ,8], for which the resulting numbers have no clear inter-
pretation and hence no real meaning (as discussed in [8]). But this is not 
true for the ideas developed in this paper, since the de Finet ti approach 
gives a precise meaning to the measurement of uncertainty. Furthermore, 
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Bayesian probability theory shows how optimal decision-making in the face of 
uncertainty depends, in fact, on probabilities defined in this way ( 9]. In 
addition, any optimal decision must be consistent with .!2!!, coherent set of 
probability assessments for the relevant uncertain outcomes, whether these 
assessments are made explicitly or not. The chance that a set of assessments 
that are made implicitly are actually coherent must be exceedingly remote. 
2) If the purpose of the causality assessment is to guide particular 
decisions, it is not usually necessary to evaluate each component probability 
precisely. As we shall show in Section B, a Bayesian causality assessment 
requires the evaluation of the probabilities of several different proposi-
tions. Suppose an asses.sor determines that his probability for one of these 
propositions lies somewhere between two numbers, say 1/3 and 1/2, but he finds 
it very difficult to evaluate it with greater precision. It is always 
possible to go through the entire causality assessment, using 1/3 wherever the 
probability in question appears, and then repeat the analysis using 1/ 2 
instead. If the overall causality assessment is not very different, then 
there is no need to evaluate this particular probability more precisely. If 
it is, and some contemplated decision might hinge on the difference, then 
further work is unavoidable. The point is that such .. sensitivity analyses" 
can always be carried out, with respect to the probabilities that prove to be 
the most difficult to assess; if it turns out to make no real difference which 
number in a certain range is used, then there is no need to introduce what 
seems like an arbitrary precision. If it matters, some creative tinkering 
using Bayes' Theorem or some other device based on probability theory is 
necessary to solve the Jroblem. 
12 
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3) What is the alternative to quantifying uncertainty? It is hard to see how 
the evidence about different factors and from different sources can be weighed 
and merged in a reasonable and nonarbitrary way without using quantitative 
methods that start with the explicit measurement of uncertainty. Certainly, 
as we argued in [1], no qualitative methotls yet developed have come close to 
achieving this goal. 
There is still one important issue to address: how can you know if a 
probability appraisal is "right"? If probability measures subjective degree 
of belief, then this question seems meaningless (unless it addresses the 
problem of how someone else could determine whether the assessor is honestly 
announcing his real opinions, a problem that we shall not address here). But 
this is not the end of the story. Probabilities of propositions about future 
observables can be converted into predictions about the values that these 
observables will assume, and the validity of the predictions can be subjected 
_to empirical checks. For example, suppose two different coherent assessment 
methods are used to produce probabilities for a set of propositions about 
future observables, and one method consistently assigns higher probabilities 
to the propositions that turn out to be true, and lower probabilities to the 
ones that turn out false, than the other method. Then it seems reasonable to 
conclude that even though both methods are coherent, one of the methods is 
more in tune with the world than the other, and in the future (everything else 
remaining reasonably the same), one would want to modify his own opinions to 
concur with probabilities generated by that method rather that by its less 
effective alternative. 
Now, the proposition that the suspected drug caused the adverse event is 
certainly not about any future observable. It is retrodictive rather than 
predictive in character, and typically whether the drug actually caused the 
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adverse event in that particular case or not will never be known with 
certainty. Thus, the validity of a causality assessment method is not subject 
to direct empirical check, in which the probabilities it produces are con-
verted into predictions and the accuracy of these predictions is determined. 
Nonetheless, using Bayes' Theorem, it is possible to convert the causality 
assessment problem into a series of probability assessments, the propositions 
in each of which are about the values of future observables. Thus, in 
principle, the Bayesian approach to causality assessment allows the logical 
incorporation of a series of methods for evaluating components of the overall 
uncertainty about drug causation, and each of the methods can be subjected to 
empirical tests of its soundness. 
B. AN OUTLINE OF THE BAYESIAN APPROACH 
1. Collecting the Facts 
The first step in the Bayesian approach is to collect the facts of the 
case. The assessor is required to identify the patient's clinical condition 
preceding the onset of the adverse event, the type of adverse event, the 
possible causes of the event, and the details of the evolution of the event: 
1) Identify the clinical condition Mand the type of the adverse event Et 
M is a "generic·· specification of the disease for which the patient is 
undergoing treatment, along with known co-morbidity (for example, M might 
denote pneumococcal pneumonia or severe congestive heart failure). Et is 
the "'generic ... type of the adverse event (for example, gastritis or aplastic 
anemia), not a detailed description of the particular case at hand, which is 
denoted by E. 
specificity. 
These identifications can be made with different degrees of 
However, the important point is that they should be made 
explicitly at the bE!ginning of the assessment, and thereafter whenever the 
assessment refers to "M" or '"Et", the meaning should remain the same. 
2) List the possible causes for the adverse event E 
The Bayesian approach requires that the alternative etiologies be listed 
in such a way that the elements of the list are mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive. The list should include possible drug causes (D1 to Dn), the 
clinical condition M, nondrug treatment modalities, environmental exposures, 
and, of course, the possibility of some '"unknown" cause. 
It is necessary to clarify what it means to say that a drug "causes E". 
The proposition 11 D--+ E" is true if E would not have happened as and when it 
did had D not been administered. This does not preclude the possibility that 
some attributes of the clinical condition M were also necessary for E to 
occur. Thus, if the listed possible causes are the drug D, the clinical 
condition M and ··unknown", then the proposition .. M--+E" means not only that E 
was a sequela to M, but also that E would have happened if D had not been 
administered. That is, D-causation includes the possibility of an "inter-
action" between D and M, while M-causation expressly rules out D involvement. 
Suspected drug interactions must be specifically incorporated into the 
list of possible causes. More precisely, when there is more than one drug as 
a causal candidate, if an interaction between drugs D1 and D2 is considered!. 
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priori as a possible cause, the list must include the hypotheses D1 alone, D2 
alone, and 01 and D2 jointly. 
The list of causes is important in the Bayesian approach, since the 
approach works by partitioning the total probability, 1, among the various 
causal hypotheses, given all the elicited evidence. Thus, if a new etio-
logical candidate is introduced to the list of causes, the causality assess-
ment can change. 
3) Record the relevant details about the case at hand 
It is most convenient to think about the case information that needs to be 
recorded in terms of the chronology or time-course of the event E, ~n example 
of which is illustrated in figure 1. The symbols Hi, Ti, Ch, De and Re, which 
refer to different chronological classes of case information, are defined as 
follows: 
Hi (patient's history) contains information about the patient that 
antedates E. Typically, Hi might include data about previous experiences with 
the suspect (and related) drugs and special demographic, behavioral, clinical 
or genetic risk classes for events of type Et to which the patient belongs. 
Ti describes the time of onset of E in relation to the administration of 
the drugs the patient has received, including (when available) the time-course 
of prodromal events like subclinical findings and early clinical signs and 
symptoms. 
16 
; 
.. 
Ch ('characteristics of E) refers to the period between the time of onset 
and dechallenge ( or until E clears, if no dechallenge occurs). Ch might 
include data about drug levels in tissues or body fluids, as well as other 
details in clinical presentation, laboratory results, pathological findings, 
·or time-course that allow E to be more precisely described or classified. 
De and Re refer to events in time periods initiated by dechallenge and 
rechallenge with the suspect drugs, when these occur. With respect to with-
drawal of a particular drug D, De typically includes whether the symptoms 
associated with E abated when D was withdrawn (or its dosage reduced), and, if 
so, the time-course and clinical characteristics of this response. Similarly, 
Re typically records whether an event of type E reappeared following re-
challenge ( reintroduction of the drug or increase in dosage after previous 
dosage reduction), as well as the time it took for this to happen and any 
characteristics of the new event that provide differential etiological 
information. If a second dechallenge occurred following a positive response 
to rechallenge, a new class of information, De2, must be introduced; 
similarly, Re2, De3, and so on may be necessary. In each case, all in-
formation about events in the relevant time period that can help distinguish 
between the various etiological candidates should be included in the appro-
priate chronological class. 
2. Evaluating the Evidence 
After the facts have been collected, their evidentiary significance must 
be assessed. In this section, we describe the goal of this assessment and the 
Bayesian strategy for achieving this goal. 
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The Goal 
According to the Bayesian approach, the goal of causality assessment can 
be defined in the following way: for a drug D suspected as a cause of the 
adverse event E, calculate the posterior odds in favor of D-causation, 
(1) P(o--..EIB,c) 
P(D~_E IB,C) 
Here D-f+E represents the proposition that the drug D did not cause the event 
E; that is, that E would have occurred as and when it did even if D had not 
been administered. C is the case information (that is, Hi, Ti, Ch, De, and 
Re) described ·in the previous section. The additio~al conditioning term (B) 
that is not shown in the formula for Bayes·theorem i~ section 1 is background 
information. B contains the fact that an event of type Et has occurred in a 
patient with clinical condition Mat some time after the drugs on the list of 
possible causes have been administered in a specified way. Unlike the 
case-specific information in C, the information in B makes no further 
reference to the particular patient whose case is currently undergoing 
assessment. In addition, B contains all the background information that the 
assessor might bring to bear to analyze any such case, including information 
about the drugs, their pharmacology and kinetics, indications, and risk 
factors that alter the chance of adverse effects. 
The Strategy 
Using de Finetti's measure, one could evaluate directly the probabilities 
in the numerator and denominator of the posterior odds displayed in equation 
18 
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(1), but, given the complexity of most causality assessment problems, such an 
act of .. global introspection'" could almost never be carried out consistently 
with all the opinions one holds about the meaning and relevance of the 
information in B and c. Thus, an alternative approach to the evaluation of 
the posterior odds is required. The strategy we adopt ( figure 2) is to 
decompose the posterior odds into a series of component factors, each of which 
requires probability evaluations for propositions much more specific and 
accessible to the experience and knowledge of the evaluator than the 
proposition '"D-+E'". 
We do not mean to imply that the component probability evaluations are 
.. automatic.. • They may require careful thought, and the assessor may be far 
from confident in his answers. Nonetheless, we believe that these evaluations 
are addressable problems, and future work should lead to better techniques for 
their solution. 
FIGURE 2 GOES HERE 
Strategy Step 1: Reduce to Single Suspect Drug 
In many cases, the list of possible causes will include more than one drug 
or drug interaction. The first step in the Bayesian approach is to restrict 
to the case in which there is only one suspect drug, which we shall denote by 
D. This restriction involves no loss of generality, as we show in Appendix 
III ( the reason is that Bayes' Theorem can be used to merge coherently the 
solutions of the causality assessment problems that arise when each suspect 
drug is treated in turn as though it were the only possible drug cause, into a 
solution to the overall assessment problem). 
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Strategy Step 2: Use Bayes' Theorem to Decompose the Posterior Odds 
We now turn to the Bayesian decomposition of the posterior odds. The 
first part of this step is to apply Bayes' Theorem in odds form, as presented 
in section 1: 
P(D--+EIB,C) P(D--+E 1B) P( C lo--+E, B) 
(2) 
-----------
= X 
P(D,f+E IB,C) P(D,f.E IB) P(clo~E,B) 
posterior odds prior odds likelihood ratio 
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (2), the prior odds, 
gives the odds in favor of drug causation taking into account just background 
information and disregarding any details about this particular patient and his 
adverse event. The second term on the right-hand side, the likelihood ratio, 
compares how likely are the details observed in this particular case under two 
competing etiologic hypotheses: that the drug did and did not cause the 
adverse event E. 
The advantage gained by the decomposition in equation (2) derives from the 
following consideration. As we have seen, the probabilities in the posterior 
odds refer to inherently unverifiable propositions: that the particular event 
E was or was not caused by D. On the other hand, the propositions whose 
probabilities appear in the prior odds and in the likelihood ratio are closely 
linked to predictive probabilities that can in principle be validated. We now 
turn to the connection between the prior odds and predictive probabilities. 
20 
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Strategy Step 3: Reformulate Prior Odds in Terms of Predictive Probabilities 
First, note that there is an important difference between the posterior 
and prior odds terms. Since both are evaluated conditionally on B (background 
information), they both refer to a patient with clinical condition M who has 
been administered drug D and experienced an event of type Et• However, the 
identity of the patient to whom the statement refers is different in the two 
terms. In the posterior odds, it is the pa~ticular patient for whom the 
causality assessment is being carried out, while in the prior odds it is a 
"generic" patient (for example, the "next" patient with M who suffers an event 
of this type after receiving D, for example) with the three defining 
properties - clinical condition M, exposure to D and adverse event of type 
Et• To reinforce this distinction, we shall substitute the expression 
"D_. Et" for "D-_. E" when the proposition refers to the .. generic" patient who 
developed the "generic" event (Et) rather than the particular patient and the 
particular adverse event. 
To see the connection between prior odds and predictive probabilities most 
clearly, it is easiest to focus on a special case. Imagine that records are 
available for a large group of patients with clinical condition M, and that 
the subgroup consisting of those patients who have received D is similar to 
the subgroup who have not, with respect to the distribution of any variables 
that are prognostic for the occurrence of events of type Et (except, of 
course, for exposure to D). 
The incidence of events of type Et among those patients who take Dis the 
sum of two components: the incidence of the events caused by D and the 
incidence of events not caused by D. Since the patients taking and not taking 
Dare otherwise prognostically equivalent, the incidence of events not caused 
by Din the patients taking D.is the same as the incidence of all the events 
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of type Et in the patients not taking D. Since the prior probability that an 
event is caused by Dis just the ratio of the incidence of events caused by D 
to the overall incidence of events among patients who receive D, we can 
summarize this discussion by the following equation: 
And, similarly: 
where P(Et(D) is the probability that a patient who received D will experience 
an event of type Et, and P(Et\DC) is the probability that a patient who did 
not receive D will experience an event of this type. Both these probabilities 
clearly generate predictions of the incidence of events of type Et, among 
future patients with M who do and do not receive D. 
Applying the results of the above equations to the numerator and 
denominator of the prior odds we get: 
(5) P(D--+Et I B) 
= 
P(EtlD) - P(EtlDC) • P(EtlDC) 
P(D,4EtlB) • P(EtlD) P(Et(D) 
= 
P(EtlD) - P(EtlDC) 
P(Et foe) 
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Strategy Step 4: Decompose the Likelihood Ratio 
Trying to evaluate the probability of all the case details simultaneously 
is too hard, since there 1s far too much to think about at once. Therefore, 
we shall decompose the likelihood ratio into a series of factors each 
involving probabilities for propositions about only one of the five 
chronological classes Hi, Ti, Ch, De, and Re: 
(6) ~~clo--+E,B) 
P(cln~E,B) 
Where 
(7) LR(Hi) = 
LR(Ti) = 
LR(Ch) = 
LR(De) = 
LR(Re) = 
= LR(Hi) X LR(Ti) X LR(Ch) X LR(De) X LR(Re) 
P(Hi ID--+ F;,1~2 
P(Ri In.;... E, B) 
~(Tiln--.E 2~i!E:l 
P(Ti I n-1+ E ,B,Ri) 
P(ChlD-_.E,B,Hi,Ti) 
P(ChfD-f+E,B,Hi,Ti) 
~(oelo--.E,~i!!!i!!i~h2 and 
P(De(D.,t+E,B,Hi,Ti,Ch) 
P(Re)D__.E,B,Hi,Ti,Ch,De) 
P(RefD-,t.E,B,Hi,Ti,Ch,De) 
In words, LR(Hi) might be called the likelihood ratio factor evaluating 
historical information, LR(De) the likelihood ratio factor evaluat~ng 
dechallenge information, and so forth. The order in which these factors 
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appear in equation (6) (and which factors appear as conditioning sets) is 
determined by chronology. Note that the probabilities that comprise the 
numerator and denominator of each likelihood ratio are conditioned on B 
(background information) and on the information in the likelihood terms that 
have already entered into the equation. 
Strategy Step 5: Recombine the Prior Odds and the Likelihood Ratio Terms 
to Obtain the Posterior Odds 
Recombining the prior odds and the likelihood ratio terms gives the 
Bayesian decomposition of the posterior odds for causality assessment of a 
suspected adverse drug reaction: 
Posterior Odds = Prior Odds X LR(Hi) X LR(Ti) X LR(Ch) X LR(De) X LR(Re) 
C. CAUSALITY ASSESSMENT CRITERIA AND THE BAYESIAN APPROACH 
In a second paper we address the main tactical questions for the Bayesian 
approach: how can an assessor evaluate the prior odds and the likelihood 
ratio factors? In this section we examine whether the Bayesian strategy 
satisfies the six criteria for causality assessment introduced in [ 1]. We 
state each criterion (for justifications ~d discussion, see [ 1]) and then 
discuss how it relates to the Bayesian approach. 
Criterion 1: Repeatability. When the same "state of information" is used 
more than once as input,~ causality assessment method should produce the same 
"degree of belief" as output. 
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In its present form, the details of the Bayesian approach are insuf-
ficiently specified to achieve repeatability. The difficulty is not so much 
that there are too many probability assessments to make, each of which may 
vary from one evaluation to the next even when the .. state of information"' does 
not change. Rather, the main problem is to determine in a standardized way 
what probabilities need to be evaluated for each of the components of the 
posterior odds. We believe that it will be possible to develop algorithmic 
methods based upon the Bayesian approach, in the context of specific 
drug-induced diseases (like cholestatic jaundice or Stevens-Johnson syndrome) 
or specific drugs (like digoxin). In such specific problem areas, '"canonical" 
questions for eliciting the relevant information, as well as standardized 
methods for operating with this information to determine the appropriate 
probabilities, can be constructed. The more algorithmic the methods become, 
the more they will be able to satisfy this criterion. 
Criterion 2: Explicitness. A causality assessment method should require that 
its user make explicit his "state of information", including the uncertainty 
he feels about each of its elements. 
The essence of the Bayesian approach is the explicit evaluation of 
uncertainty, so this requirement of the criterion is certainly satisfied. 
Since probabilities are most easily evaluated the more exhaustively the 
problems are decomposed, the approach encourages the user to make explicit all 
his relevant information and the relations between its elements. 
Criterion 3: Transparency. A causality assessment method must make it clear 
to the user how it produced the output 11degree of belief .. from the information 
it elicited. 
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The Bayesian approach reaches its conclusions from the component 
probability evaluations of the user by following the rules of prescriptive 
probability theory. The effect of the information in each factor on the 
output posterior odds is clear, since the posterior odds is just the product 
of the prior odds and the five likelihood ratio factors. In particular, it is 
easy to see at a glance which factors are the important ones in any assess-
ment. 
Criterion 4: Completeness. Any fact, theory, or opinion that can affect an 
evaluator's belief that a drug D caused an adverse event E must be 
incorporable by a causality assessment method into the "state of information" 
on which the assessment is based. 
In principle, any such fact, theory, or opinion can become the subject of 
a probability evaluation or the basis upon which such an evaluation is carried 
out. In particular, the Bayesian approach can deal with the three kinds of 
information singled out in [1] as essential, but not incorporable into other 
current assessment methods: uncertain information, quantitative information, 
and background information, especially epidemiological data about incidences 
and mechanistic theories from the basic sciences. Thus, the Bayesian approach 
already satisfies this criterion in principle; as better models are con-
structed to facilitate the incorporation of particular kinds of information, 
it will increasingly be able to satisfy it in practice. 
Criterion 5: Etiological balancing. Methods cannot evaluate case data just 
in terms of their concordance or discordance with the hypothesis that the drug 
D caused the event E; rather, they must compare how much more (or less) 
compatible the findings are with drug versus other causation. 
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This criterion is embedded in the architecture of the Bayesian approach. 
Criterion 6: No a priori constraints on the effects of factors. A causality 
assessment method should not limit a priori the effect that information about 
any particular factor can have on the final result. 
Each of the five likelihood ratio factors and the prior odds can range 
anywhere between zero and infinity, so the Bayesian approach places no a 
priori limits on their possible effects. Rather, these effects are only 
limited by the amount of information available and the state of the user's 
uncertainty about that information. 
DISCUSSION 
The Bayesian approach to causality assessment of adverse drug reactions 
provides an internally consistent and logical framework for assessing the 
probability that an adverse event was caused by drug therapy. The approach 
also satisfies, in principle, five of six criteria that we previously proposed 
for the evaluation of causality assessment schemes. The qualification •• in 
principle" is necessary, because as presented, the approach is difficult to 
implement and does not yet qualify as a standardized assessment method. None-
theless, the Bayesian approach does substantially better with respect to these 
criteria, compared with other currently available causality assessment methods 
[ l]. The approach does not, however, ensure the quality of the user's 
component assessments and does not solve the problem of how best to convert 
the assessments into probabilities. Clearly, an optimal result will require 
expert evaluation of the individual components. There is also much work to be 
done on how to elicit the relevant probabilities, although many useful ideas 
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and techniques already exist. The second paper in this series describes and 
illustrates some of these techniques for turning opinions about a clinical 
case into the probabilities that comprise the Bayesian assessment. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix I: The Fundamental Rules of Probability Theory 
A collection of conditional probability assessments is coherent if and 
only if the following three conditions are satisfied: 
1) The Normalization Condition: For every pair of proposition A,B, P (AIB) 
must be between O and 1, inclusive. 
2) The Additivity Condition: If A and C are mutually contradictory pro-
positions, and Bis any proposition. 
P (A or clB) = P (A(B) + P (CIB) 
3) The Multiplicative Condition: For any propositions A,B and C, 
P (A and cfB) = P (AIB) x P (CIA and B) 
= P (CIB) x P (AIB and C) 
Appendix II: Derivation of Bayes' Theorem 
Bayes' Theorem is derived from the multiplicative condition (Appendix I), 
which establishes the following equality: 
ii 
31 
(1) P(AIB) x P(CIA and B) = P(CIB) x P(A\c and B). 
Dividing both sides of (1) by P(CIB) and transposing sides gives 
(2) P(Alc and B) = [P(CIA and B) x P(AIB] / P(CIB) 
which is Bayes' Theorem. To derive the odds form of Bayes' Theorem, apply the 
theorem with Ac in place of A to obtain 
Finally, divide equation (2) by equation (3), yielding 
(4) P(Alc and B) = P(clA and B) X P(AI B) 
P(Aclc and B) P(CfAc and B) P(AcfB) 
= P(AlB) X P(clA and B) 
P(AC(B) P( C lAc and B) 
Posterior Odds = Prior Odds X Likelihood Ratio 
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Appendix III: The One-Drug-at-a-Time Strategy 
Let D1, ••• Dn represent all the (mutually contradictory) drug hypotheses on 
the list of causes, and group all the other hypotheses ( for example: M, 
"other", etc.) as N (for nondrug). 
Write PO(Di) for the posterior odds in favor of cause D1• Now let A1 
represent the hypothesis "Di or N" (that is, the cause of Eis either Di, or a 
nondrug cause), and write PO(DilA1) for the posterior odds in favor of cause 
D1, given Ai: 
Notice that PO(Di IA1) solves the causality assessment problem for a case in 
which there is only one drug causal candidate, Di• 
Claim: The following formula gives the posterior odds in favor of cause D1: 
That is, if the assessor calculates the conditional posterior odds in favor of 
cause Dj, PO(Dj{Aj), for each possible drug cause Dj, (other than Di) then he 
can merge these condition odds to obtain the unconditional posterior odds in 
favor of cause Di• 
Proof of Claim: For succinctness, we omit B and C from the right of "'I" in ~ 
all the probabilities that appear in this proof. By the multiplicative 
condition (Appendix 1): 
Since 
And 
(3) Then 
Similarly, since 
(4) Then 
Thus, 
(5) 
P(Di and Ai)= P(Ai) x P(DilAi) 
Dividing by P(At) and transposing sides 
P(DilA1) = P(D1 and A1) / P(Ai) 
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Applying equation (5) for each drug cause Di, the right-hand side of equation 
(2) is equal to 
(6) [P(D1)/P(N)] / [l +I: .. P(Dj)/P(N)] = P(Di) / [P(N) +L . . P(Dj)) 
J/1 J1'1 
Since [P(N) + L j -; i P(Dj) J includes all possible causative hypotheses other 
than D1 this term= 1-P(Di)• 
Therefore, the right hand side of the equation becomes 
P(D1) / [l-P(D1)] 
= PO(D1) 
which completes the proof of claim. 
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FIGURE 1 
Categories of Case Information Defined by Chronologic Sequence 
TIME---------------~ 
i .1 .A .A .A .A 
M D E De challenge E Re challenge 
Diagnosed Therapy Detected Clears 
I 
CH DE I ~ j-n-
M = Disease for which patient is undergoing treatment 
D = Suspected Drug 
E = Adverse Event 
Hi = Patient's History 
Ti = Timing of onset of adverse event 
Ch = Characteristics of Adverse Event 
De = De challenge 
Re = Rechallenge 
FIGURE 2 
Strategy for Arriving at the Posterior Odds of Drug Causation 
Step 1: Reduce to single suspect drug 
Step 2: Use Bayes' theorem to decompose posterior odds 
Step 3: Reformulate prior odds in terms of 
predictive probabilities 
Step 4: Decompose the likelihood ratio 
Step 5: Recombine the prior odds and the likelihood 
ratio terms to obtain the posterior odds 
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ABSTRACT 
Techniques are presented for implementing a Bayesian approach to ; 
causality assessment for adverse drug reactions. Four general techniques for 
probability evaluation are described: conditioning; analogy; the use of 
frequencies; and models. The use of these techniques in evaluating the prior 
odds and the likelihood ratio terms of the Bayesian approach is discussed and 
their application illustrated by a case in which amoxicillin is suspected of 
causing diarrhea. The Bayesian method provides a feasible, efficient, and 
logically satisfying answer to the causality assessment problem. It also 
gives new insights and increased understanding into the problem of assessing 
adverse drug reactions. 
Key words: adverse drug rections, causality assessment, Bayes Theorem, pro-
bability 
• 
INTRODUCTION 
In the first paper of this series [l] we presented a Bayesian approach to 
the problem of assessing causality in suspected adverse drug reactions. Using 
the odds ratio form of Bayes Theorem we showed how the posterior odds in 
favour of drug causation can be obtained by multiplying the prior odds by 
likelihood ratio terms for each of five separate elements of the case 
information: History (Hi); Timing (Ti); Characteristics (Ch); Dechallenge 
(De); and Rechallenge (Re). 
(1) P(D--+EIB,C) __,;; __________ = 
P(D,f+E IB,C) 
P(D--+Er IB) 
P(Df+Et I B) X LR(Hi) X LR(Ti) X LR(Ch) X LR(De) X LR(Re) 
Posterior Odds = Prior Odds x Likelihood Ratio terms 
Dis the suspected drug. 
Eis the adverse event. 
Et is the generic type of the adverse event. 
D --+E indicates that the drug caused the adverse event. 
D -/+,E indicates that the drug did not cause the adverse event. 
Bis background information. 
C is the case information. 
We argued that in principle, this approach provides a coherent framework 
for dealing with the multiple uncertainties and complexities of the adverse 
reaction causality problem. In this paper we describe techniques for applying 
this approach in practice. In Section A we discuss general techniques for 
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probability evaluation. In Section B we describe how to implement the 
Bayesian approach and demonstrate the approach using a case of diarrhea after 
amoxicillin use. 
A. GENERAL TECHNIQUES FOR PROBABILITY EVALUATION 
In this section we describe four general techniques for evaluating 
probabilities that can be used to advantage in the causality assessment con-
text. They are: conditioning; analogy; the use of frequencies; and the use 
of models. 
Conditioning: Sometimes, evaluating the probability of a proposit~on can 
seem difficult because the assessor's thoughts about the proposition depend on 
which of several other propositions are true. For example, if an assessor 
wants to det~rmine the probability that an event of type Et will occur as an 
adverse rection to a drug D within a day of receiving a specified dosage of D, 
he might find that his assessment of this probability depends on the mechanism 
of the reaction (whether the reaction is immunologic or dose-dependent, for 
example). Or again, in assessing the probability that an event of type Et, 
which is not caused by D, will occur in a specified time period, the evaluator 
might want to consider separately each possible alternative cause for the 
event. 
In such cases, the Law of Total Probability (see Appendix I) can 
frequently be applied. First, the various possibilities on which the 
evaluation depends must be listed in such a way that one and o:lly of one of 
them can be true (for example, the mechanism for the reactioc may be immuno-
logic, dose-dependent, or "other"; or the alternative, nondrug causes for the 
event might be a viral infection for which the patient is bei=g treated, some • 
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other, nondiagnosed infection, or another "unknown" cause). Then, the 
assessor must evaluate the probability of the proposition in question, 
conditional on each listed possibility. Next he must evaluate the probability 
for each of the possibilities he has conditioned upon; this evaluation 
involves inherently unobservable propositions, but in our experience assessors 
often have little trouble partitioning their belief among a set of mutually 
contradictory mechanistic theories (the trickiest part is to decide how much 
probability to assign the catch-all ,. other" or "unknown"). Finally, the 
assessor puts together these two sets of evaluations according to the Law of 
Total Probabilty. An example of this procedure will be presented in Section B 
below. 
Analogy: .As explained in the first paper of this series, probability is 
just a measure of the assessor's uncertainty. Thus, it is sometimes possible 
for an assessor to evaluate a probability for a proposition by thinking about 
some other proposition about which his uncertainty is comparable and whose 
probability is easier to appraise. 
For example, suppose you believe that the pharmacological mechanisms by 
which two related drugs can cause a particular kind of adverse reaction are 
very similar. Then it may be reasonable to suppose that the timing distri-
butions for events of this type as adverse reactions to the two drugs are 
similar (in particular, say, the probability that E occurs within one day 
after receiving D1, given that D1 caused E, would be nearly the same as the 
same probability with respect to D2)• But the assessor may have much more 
experience with one of the drugs than with the other, in which case he might 
be quite confident about his assessment of the timing distribution cor-
responding t_o the familiar drug, which he can then transfer ( perhaps with 
minor modifications) to the less familiar one. 
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As another example, suppose an assessor needs to evaluate his probability 
that the next infant receiving a course of therapy with a new "cillin"-type 
antibiotic drug will develop diarrhea. He can base this evaluation on the 
knowledge that reported incidences of diarrhea following therapy with other 
drugs in this group range from about S to 25%, with a mode of about 10% [2,3]·; 
and so, if he is unaware of any feature of the new drug that would distinguish 
it from others in its class with respect to its propensity to cause diarrhea, 
he should assess the required probability, by analogy, at about 1/10. 
Frequencies: Sometimes, an assessor may have access to observed frequen-
cies that are clearly relevant to a probability evaluation problem he is 
trying to solve. For example, he might want to evaluate his probability that 
the next infant receiving a specified course of amoxicillin therapy will 
develop diarrhea, and he notes that a study monitoring outpatients in a large 
pediatric teaching hospital reported 130 cases of diarrhea out of 1320 
patients within two days of beg~nning amoxicillin therapy [ 2]. 
necessarily evaluate his probability as 13/132? 
Should he 
In general, the answer to this question is no. There are two primary 
reasons for this. The first has to do with the similarity between the 
patients for whom the probability evaluation is relevant and the patients upon 
whom the observed frequencies are based. The class of patients to which the 
probability evaluation refers is precisely specified by the conditions that 
appear to the right of the "I .. in the statement of the probability. For 
example, if the probability in question, P(Et ln,M) (the probability that a 
patient with clinical condition M who receives D in a specified way will 
experience an event of ty_pe Et) the class consists of all patients who have 
the clinical condition defined by Mand receive the course of therapy denoted 
by D. Differences i~ such factors as age, sex, severity of M, comorbidity, or 
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the dosage of D, however, may limit the applicability of frequencies reported 
in the literature to the specific class of patients for which probabilities 
are being assessed. 
The second reason that probabilities may differ from observed frequencies 
has to do with chance variation. Even if the patients for whom frequency 
information is available are characterized precisely, the probability and the 
observed frequency need not coincide, since the observed frequency reflects to 
some extent the vagaries of chance, especially if the sample size is small. 
Now, if the frequency information is based on patients in the class 
defined by the probability evaluation problem, and these patients have no 
other special defining characteristics and their number is large, then any 
coherent evaluation of the probability must be very close to the observed 
frequency. Otherwise, adjustments have to be made. Correcting for sample 
size is easy; dealing with the difference between the classes to which 
probability evaluation problems and observed frequencies refer is not. 
Informally, we suggest the following solution to the problem. Use 
observed frequencies, when available, to provide an °anchor" or initial 
solution to a probability evaluation problem. Then think about the ways in 
which the class to which the frequency information refers may differ from the 
class relevant to the probability evaluation, and decide what direction these 
differences suggest for changing the initial solution. (For example, if the 
observed frequencies for diarrhea following amoxicillin therapy were based 
only on inf ants in day-care centers, among whom one expects to fir.d an ele-
vated incidence of gastroenteritis, the frequencies should be adjusted down-
ward to apply to the general inf ant population.) Finally, adjust the 
probability evaluation in the appropriate direction. 
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Sometimes, it is possible to use the connection between probability and 
frequencies to help evaluate probabilities, even when relevant observed 
frequencies are not available, by the following psychological ploy: the 
device of imaginary results. Suppose that an assessor has a great deal of 
clinical experience with a particular kind of adverse event, and, for example, 
he must evaluate the probability that an event of this type will occur within 
one day of beginning D-therapy, given that it occurs sometime in the month 
after the therapy begins. Such an assessor might find it useful to draw upon 
his experience by imagining a great number of patients in the relevant class 
who have an event within a month after beginning D-therapy, and asking himself 
what proportion of those patients he thinks will experience the event in the 
first day. If he can answer this question, he should use this proportion as 
his answer to the required probability evaluation problem. 
Models: A model is a formal and general approach to probability evalua-
tion. Models can be viewed as systematic applications of the ideas of condi-
tioning and analogy. Because they can be constructed in accordance with the 
rules of probability theory, they give a framework for the coherent merger of 
different kinds of relevant information. As an example of the kind of model 
that would be helpful in the causality assessment context, think of the time 
of onset of a dose-dependent adverse reaction to drug D. This time cannot be 
predicted with certainty, but it depends in part on certain pharmacological 
properties of the drug, physiological aspects of the reaction, and specific 
attributes of the patient. A model for time to onset would specify how the 
mean reaction time depends on a particular set of drug-event-patient para-
meters, and it would also specify the pattern of the residual variability 
(which is~ determined by the specified parameters). If such a model were 
constructed, the causality assessor would only need to specify the values of 
the input parameters for the particular case at hand, and he could then use • 
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the model to compute the probability that an event of type Et caused by drug D 
would occur just when the event E undergoing assessment occurred (which is the 
numerator of the likelihood ratio for timing). 
Such models would be of great benefit in implementing the Bayesian 
strategy, because they would reduce the number of probability evaluations that 
an assessor would have to perform in carrying out any particular causality 
assessment, they would substantially reduce the subjectivity in each of the 
remaining evaluations, and they would permit general predictive tests that 
would substantiate the models' and hence the whole Bayesian procedure's vali-
dity. We do not yet have such models, but one of the great advantages of the 
Bayesian approach is that it makes clear what models need to be developed, and 
it allows their incorporation into the causality assessment procedure as they 
are developed. 
B. HOW TO IMPLEMENT THE BAYESIAN APPROACH: EXAMPLE OF AN APPLICATION TO A 
CLINICAL CASE 
In this Section, we apply the Bayesia..~ approach to a case of suspected 
amoxicillin-induced diarrhea. The analysis is not based on an exhaustive 
review of the literature; rather, it represents the clinical consensus of the 
authors of the paper, only one of whom (M.S.K.) has special expertise in this 
area. Nonetheless, we believe that the analysis provides a good introduction 
to the Bayesian approach and that the conclusion we draw is both essentially 
correct and consistent with all our opinions relating to the problem. 
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THE CASE 
B.L. is a 17-month-old male day-care center attendee who on December 10 
developed signs and symptoms of an upper respiratory tract infection with 
rhinorrhea and cough, but without fever or gastrointestinal symptoms. On the 
third day of his illness, his temperature rose to 39.4°c, he became irritable, 
and he began to pull at his ears. He was seen by his pediatrician on that day 
and was diagnosed as having bilateral otitis media. Treatment was initiated 
with amoxicillin suspension in a dose of 125 mg t.i.d. Over the next · 24 
hours, B. L. had three watery bowel movements. By the fifth day, he was 
afebrile; the diarrhea continued, but without exacerbation. His mother tele-
phoned the pediatrician, who suggested continuing the medication and 
encouraging fluid intake. B. L. remained afebrile and became less irritable 
and more playful, but the diarrhea persisted. The amoxicillin was discon-
tinued after a 10-day course, and the diarrhea resolved within two days 
following dechallenge and did not recur. 
ANALYSIS 
The analysis is performed in six steps that are shown in table 1. The 
six subsections that follow each deal with one step in the analysis. Each 
subsection begins with a general discussion of the issues involved. This is 
followed by direct application to the case outlined above. 
TABLE 1 GOES HERE 
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1) The Case "Parameters" 
a) The Clinical Condition (M) and the Adverse Event Type (Et): The 
Bayesian strategy requires that the patient's clinical condition M and the 
type of adverse event Et be unambiguously defined and that the definitions 
then be consistently applied in every subsequent probability evaluation. The 
level of specificity of these definitions can make a difference in how easy it 
is to carry out probability evaluations in which they play a role. 
b) The Time Horizon: It is usually a good idea to attach a definite time 
horizon to the definition of the event type ( that is, the definition of the 
event type is modified to include the requirement that the event occur 
sometime within a fixed amount of time - the time horizon -- after the 
administration of D). Specifying the time horizon is particularly useful in 
assessing the prior odds and the distribution for ·time to onset of the event 
as a function of the cause of the event. As a rule of thumb, we usually take 
as the horizon for a relatively common event a period at least as long as a 
"reasonable" time period for the event to occur as an adverse reaction to the 
suspect drug D, while for an uncommon event, the horizon might be much 
longer. For example, if 
appropriate time horizon 
the event is diarrhea (as in the example), an 
might be one or two weeks; if the event is 
Stevens-Johnson syndrome the horizon might be one year. The time horizon 
chosen can facilitate the assessment, but it does not affect the evaluation of 
the posterior odds in favor of drug causation. More accurately, we should say 
it should not affect the evaluation, and would not, if the assessor were 
coherent. Changing the time horizon will change the values of the different 
components of the posterior odds, but the changes compensate (see Appendix 
III). For example, shortening the time horizon typically increases the prior 
odds in favor of drug causation, but- proportionately lowers the likelihood 
ratio for timing. 
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c) The Possible Causes of E: The assessor must make a list of the 
possible causes for E that he wishes to consider in his evaluation. Since 
the Bayesian method works by partitioning the total probability, 1, between 
the listed causes it is important that the items on the list be mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive. Note that the first item in the list, 
drug-causation, has a very specific meaning in this context. The proposition 
D--+E means that E would not have happened as and when it did had D not been 
administered; this does not rule out the possibility that some aspects of the 
patient's clinical condition were also necessary for E to occur. Thus, if 
there is an interaction between the effects of the drug and other non-drug 
causes for E, the interaction is credited to drug causation. 
~-----------------~ 
The Case "Parameters": Application 
The Clinical Condition M: Mis the upper respiratory tract infection 
(presumably viral), which by the third day is accompanied by fever and 
bilateral otitis media. 
The Adverse Event Type Er: A bout of frequent, loose stools, which we 
shall hereafter refer to as diarrhea. 
The Time Horizon: One week from initiation of D-therapy. 
Possible Causes of E: (1) Amoxicillin (denoted D hereafter); (2) 
Late-occurring GI symptoms secondary to the original i~fection (that is, 
M); (3) Coincidental gastroenteritis. 
I 
-------~ -------------------
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2) Collecting The Relevant Case Information 
The Bayesian approach requires the assessor to list the relevant case 
information in each of five classes, in response to the prompts given in Table 
2 ( the questions in Table 2 are posed with respect to a particular suspect 
drug D; if more than one drug is a possible cause of D, repeat the questions 
with respect to each of them). Note that the relevant information is not the 
whole case report but only those aspects of it that are useful for 
distinguishing drug from non-drug causation. Also, the quantity of 
information in each of the five classes can vary widely from case to case. In 
particular, for most cases, Hi and Ti contain important and sometimes abundant 
data. On the other hand, many events are irreversible, and so dechallenge and 
rechallenge cannot occur. Even if E is reversible, it may be sufficiently 
serious that rechallenge is not ethically feasible and so does not take place. 
,---------------------, 
The Relevent Case Information: Application 
fHi: There is no information about the patient's previous experience with DJ 
for events of type Et but two aspects of the case places the patient at I 
jspecial risk for diarrhea from a non-drug cause (cause 2 or 3 above) he is I 
la day care-attendee, and the diarrhea occurred in December. J 
ITi: E began within one day after D-therapy was iniated. 
jCh: The only relevant information in this category is the duration of E; 
fthe diarrhea persisted for ten days before dechallenge took place. 
I 
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De: The diarrhea resolved within two days after dechallenge. 
Re: No rechallenge occurred. 
L__ _________________ ___J 
3) Evaluating The Prior Odds 
(2) Prior 
Odds 
= 
P(D__.E,B) 
P(D-,l+EIB) 
= 
P(ErlD) - P(ErlDC) 
P(EtlDC) 
As previously demonstrated in [ 1], the prior odds can be regarded as a 
function of two incidence probabilities, P(Et ID) and P(Et I DC), the first 
giving the incidence of events of type Et among patients with M who receive 
the specified course of D-therapy, and the second giving the same incidence 
for an otherwi$e similar group of patients who do not receive D. Usually, 
such incidences are not known precisely. However, the assessor can always use 
the following tactic, whose precise formulation and probabilistic justi-
fication are presented in Appendix II: first, he expresses his uncertainty 
about the "true" incidences in the form of a probability distribution for 
these two quantities; then, he uses the appropriate midpoints of these 
distributions as his probabilities P(Et Lo) and P(Et I oc); finally he computes 
the prior odds as a function of these probabilities according to the formula 
shown above. 
It is frequently possible to employ this tactic in a more informal way, 
particularly when the assessor has access to reasonably extensive and relevant 
frequency information (as is often the case for the i:lcidence of events of 
so 
... 
type Et when D is not administered, because estimates for the incidence of 
such events in the general population can frequently be obtained from the 
medical literature). When such frequency estimates exist, they can be used to 
evaluate the relevant probabilities directly, without constructing 
distributions for the .. true.. incidences, as in the discussion above on the 
general relation between probabilities and frequencies. But the cautions 
issued there hold: the assessor may need to make adjustments to the observed 
frequencies, since he is interested in the incidence among patients with 
clinical condition M, not the general population. If patients with Mare at 
greater or less than average risk for events of type Ee, the assessor needs to 
modify the general incidences accordingly. Also, if the use of the drug Dis 
high in the general population, the population incide~ce of events of type Ee 
represents mixtures of the incidences with and without D, and some adjustment 
is necessary before the observed frequencies can be used to give estimates of 
P(Etloc) alone. 
Another informal method that sometimes works when information about the 
"true"' incidence is limited involves applying the analogy technique for evalu-
ating probabilities. For example, the assessor may believe that the 
connection between the drug D and the event E of interest is the same range as 
some other drug-event associations, whose incidence figures are reasonably 
well-estimated in the literature, and he can adjust these incidences figures 
to give his P(EtlD). 
But suppose neither of the informal substitution methods discussed in the 
previous two paragraphs works, and the assessor feels quite vague about what 
the "true" incidence for events of type Et really is. As suggested in the 
first paragraph of this section, he should then try to assess a distribution 
that describes his uncertainty about the relevant "true.. incidence. For 
example, he may believe that the .. true"' incidence for events of type Et 
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following administration of Dis somewhere between, say, 1/1000 and 1/10,000, 
but he cannot discriminate any more finely than this. Assuming that his 
uncertainty is approximately uniform over the "order of magnitude" scale, the 
argument given in Appendix II suggests that he should assess P(EtlD) as 1/2558 
(this is the mean of a distribution that is uniform in the log, or order of 
magnitude, scale, between 1/ 1000 and 1/ 10,000). The point is that the fact 
that the assessor's information is quite diffuse does not preclude evaluating 
a prior odds that accurately reflects his uncertainty. 
Of course, when information is very diffuse and the assessor's opinion is 
correspondingly vague, his prior odds can change substantially if he gets 
access to new data that allows the .. true .. incidence to be estimated much more 
sharply. This in no way implies that the kind of calculation described above 
is "wrong"; only that the value of new information can be high when little is 
known. 
,-----------------
The Prior Odds: Application 
To calculate the prior odds, we estimate the numerator and denominator 
!of the ratio on the right hand side of equation (2), using observed 
I frequencies obtained from a study monitoring antibiotic-associated 
!gastrointestinal symptoms in pediatric outpatients in Montreal (B.L.'s home)f 
l(some results from this study, but not the raw data that we use, are 
lpresented in [2,3]). In addition, we use data from Maricopa County, 
IArizona, presented in [4,5]. 
The first quantity we need to estimate is P(EtlD) - P(EtlDC); this 
!difference estimates the "true" incidence of D-caused cases of events of 
ltype Et• In the Montreal ~tudy, about 10% of the more than 1,300 patients 
I 
I 
I 
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freceiving amoxicillin suffered from diarrhea within a week of beginning 
ltherapy. How many of these were drug-induced? To answer this question, we 
!would like to know what the incidence of diarrhea in the same period would 
lbe among patients with M if they were treated with a drug as effective as 
lamoxicillin that could not induce diarrhea as a side effect. Of course, no 
lsuch drug exists. However, the lowest incidence of diarrhea in the study 
1£ollowed trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole therapy, and was of the order of 
12.5% in the first week of therapy. Thus, we estimate that the incidence (per 
lchild) of amoxicillin-caused diarrhea in the first week of therapy is at 
lleast 0.1 - 0.025 = 0.075. However, this is probably an underestimate, since 
Isome of the diarrhea following trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole may represent 
!adverse reactions to this drug. Thus, we must adjust our estimate of the 
lincidence in nondrug-induced diarrhea downward somewhat, and as a result 
!increase our estimate of the incidence of amoxicillin-induced diarrhea. 
To decide how much of an adjustment to make, we argued along different 
I lines. A lower bound for the incidence of nondrug-induced diarrhea can be 
!obtained by thinking about the spontaneous occurrence of diarrhea in which no 
!drug involvement is possible because the affected child was taking no drugs 
lprior to the outbreak of the diarrhea. We assume that one to two-year old 
!children experience approximately orie such episode per year on average (this 
!estimate is based primarily on the data in [4]), which is equivalent to an 
lincidence (per child) of about 0.019 per week. This figure must be increased 
lsomewhat, since it does not condition on the children having a viral 
linfection (M), which increases the probability of developing diarrhea. We 
lhave thus estimated the incidence (per child) of nondrug-induced diarrhea 
!among children with M, in the week following initiation of amoxicillin 
!therapy, to be greater than 0.019 and less than 0.025, and we adopt the value 
)of 0.02. Thus, our estimate of the incidence (per child) of drug-caused 
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fdiarrhea among such children in this time period is 0.1-0.02 = Q.08: this 
fis our assessment of P(EtlD) - P(EtlDc). 
Thus, applying equation (2), we evaluate the prior odds in favor of 
1causation as 
Prior Odds= [P(EtlD) - P(EtlDC)] / [P(Et(J>C)] = 0.08/0.02 = 4.0 
L_ _________________ _J 
4) Evaluating The Likelihood Ratio Factor for History 
To evaluate the likelihood ratio factors, it is necessary to assess the 
probability for all the differentially diagnostic information elicited in 
response to the questions summarized in Table 2, given the contradictory 
hypotheses that D did and did not cause the adverse event E. 
There is a conceptual difference between LR(Hi) and the other factors. 
Each of the other factors involves thinking in the forward direction, from a 
cause to its observable effects, while the information in Hi occurred before 
the event E, and so it is more difficult to think about how likely the events 
in Hi were to happen, conditional on the cause of an event that occurred after 
it did. 
The representation for LR(Hi) given in equation (3, below) requires the 
assessor to think in "reverse chronology" ( conditioning on the cause of E to 
evaluate the probability of an event occurring before E), which is difficult. 
(3) LR(Hi) 
= 
E£!!!l~--+ E , B) 
P(Hil D,4E,B) 
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Thus, it is easier to think about LR(Hi) in terms of the following alternative 
representation: 
(4) LR(Hi) 
= 
P(D--+E IHi,B) / P(D-,4,E IHi,B) 
------ .~----------------t---
P(D--.Et Is> / P(D~Et )B) 
In words, LR(Hi) is just the ratio of the odds in favor of the drug causation 
taking into account the information in Hi (and no other case information) to the 
prior odds in favor of drug causation {ignoring the information in Hi). Seen in 
this way, the information in Hi serves as an adjustment to the prior odds, based 
on additional information about the patient that predates the occurrence of E. 
In effect, the relevant "reference set"' in which to place the patient shifts 
from the general set of patients with M who experience an event of type Et after 
the specified course of D-therapy, to those who share the same relevant history 
as the particular patient whose case is the subject of the assessment. 
The adjustments to the prior odds required to evaluate LR(Hi) are often 
quite subjective, because the information that must be taken into account is too 
specific to expect to find readily assimilable observed frequencies based on 
large numbers of cases in the literature. Thus, it is useful to realize that 
certain types of historical information, which seem to affect the incidence of 
events of type Et, can be disregarded. In particular, according to equation 
(3), a datum in Hi will make LR(Hi) differ from 1 only if it affects the 
incidence of events of type Et differentially between drug and nondrug causes. 
That is, if, say, the patient had some special attribute that doubled his risk 
for events of type Et no matter what the cause, and the possession of this 
attribute by the patient was the only information in Hi, LR(Hi) would be 1. 
Thus, any such attributes can be disregarded in calculating LR(Hi). 
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The Likelihood Ratio Factor for History: Application I 
I ~ 
We assume that day-care center attendees are 1.4 times as likely to I 
I suffer from non-drug-induced diarrhea (because of the greater exposure rate) I 
las the general pediatric population (this estimate is primarily based on data I 
lin [5)), while they are at no added risk for drug-induced diarrhea. But we I 
lmust also include in our analysis the fact that the diarrhea occurred in I 
fDecember. Based on evidence presented in [5] and general pediatric experince 
!the incidence of non-drug induced diarrhea is approximately twice as high in 
I the fall and winter as the yearly average. The season would be expected to 
lhave no effect on drug-caused diarrhea. Thus, because of the history of 
jday-care attendance and occurrence in the December the term P(D~Et Hi,B) in 
lequation (4) is larger than P(D~EtlB) by a factor of 1.4 x 2.0 = 2.8. On thej 
(other hand, since these elements of history have no effect on the rate of I· 
!drug-induced diarrhea, P(D---.EcfB,H) = P(D--+EcfB). Using these results in ·I 
lequation 4 we get: 
LR(Hi) = 
---------------------
= 112.s = o.36 
L--------· ---------~ 
• 
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S. Evaluating Other Likelihood Ratio Factors 
The likelihood ratio factors for timing, characteristics, dechallenge and 
rechallenge can best be evaluated by determining, separately, their numerators 
and denominators. In carrying out these evaluations, the techniques of 
conditioning and analogy will be frequently applied. In particular, the 
probabilities given drug causation will depend on the mechanism of the adverse 
reaction, and the probabilities given nondrug causation will typically depend on 
what the alternative etiologies are; in both cases, conditioning on the 
appropriate entities is required. 
The calculations involved in evaluating these factors are relatively 
straightforward, compared to the prior odds and LR(Hi), and further discussion 
will be deferred to the example. Here, we consider only one issue. Notice that 
the information in chronologically preceding categories is conditioned upon when 
the probability for information in succeeding categories is calculated, as 
required by the multiplicative condition for coherence (see Appendix I in (1]). 
For example, when calculating the probability that sulfonamide-induced 
Stevens-Johnson begins, say, three days after onset of therapy, it is necessary 
to condition on historical information, like the fact that the patient under 
consideration is atopic. This successive conditioning at first sight seems to 
introduce a great deal of complexity to the evaluations, but in fact this is not 
generally so. All the probability evaluations required for these likelihood 
ratio factors are conditional on the cause of the event E (D, or some other 
cause); and conditional on the cause, the sets of information in the various 
categories are often independent, as would surely be the case with the timing 
information and the fact that · the patient is atopic in the Stevens-Johnson 
example. When this conditional independence does not obtain, of course, the 
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relevant conditioning information must be taken into account for a valid ~ ~ 
probability evaluation. This point is amply illustrated in the case analysis 
below. 
,---------------·----. 
Other Likelihood Ratio Factors: Application 
ILR(Ti): Recall that we condition on (as part of B) the information that the 
levent E begins after D-therapy is initiated. Taking this into account, the 
!pediatrician in our group (M.S.K.) assessed the following distributions for 
I time to onset of an event of type Et starting from the beginning of D-
I therapy, in a patient with M, given (because of the time horizon) that an 
!event of this type occurs within one week of the beginning of D-therapy: 
Day of onset ( i) P( day i In--. E) P( day dM--. E) P(day ilE coincidental) 
1 • 33 .33 .14 
2 .33 .22 .14 
3 .20 • 15 • 14 
4 .07 .ll • 14 
5 .04 .09 .14 
6 .02 .06 .14 
7 .01 .04 .14 
!It should be noted that none of these timing distributions depend on the fact! 
!that B.L. attended a day-care center or that the diarrhea occurred in De-
Jcember; that is, the information in Ti and the information in Hi are indepen-1 
ldent, given the cause of E. The distribution for P(day ilM --+E) was inducedj 
!from the following distribution, which represents the probability of getting 
!diarrhea beginning the first day of M: .25 first day, .25 second day, .15 
!third day, .1 fourth day, .07 fifth day, .05 sixth day, .04 seventh day, .03 
feighth day, .02 ninth day, .04 tenth day or later. The distribution shown in( 
ithe table above is obtained from this one by conditioning on the diarrhea 
lbeginning between the third day (when D-therapy began) and the ninth day, a 
jweek later. 
Since E actually began within 24 hours of initiating D-therapy, the 
fnumerator of the likelihood ratio factor for timing is .33. To evaluate the 
ldenominator, we need to evaluate two additional quantities, the probabilitiesf 
ffor M--+E and "E coincidental", given that D did not cause E. By the addi-
!tion rule, these two numbers sum to 1. Knowing that (i.e., conditioning 
!upon) the patient had a viral U.R.I. (M), our pediatrician (M.S.K.) estimated! 
lthat among the two possible nondrug causes, M would be approximately three 
(times likely as coincidental gastroenteritis. Thus, the denominator of the 
jlikelihood ratio for timing, using the Law of Total Probability, is ob-
I tained as follows, where "day 1 ·· is short for "onset of E occurs within 24 
jhours" and every probability is conditional on background information B: 
IP(day 11 D-/+E) = [P(day 1lM--+E) x P(M--+Eln-,t.E)] + 
!Thus, 
[P(day 1'E "coincidental" x P(E "coincidental" ln-f,.E)] 
= (.33 X .75) + (.14 X .25) 
= .28 
ILR(Ti) = P(day 1 I D-+E) / P(day 1 I Df+E) 
= .33 I .28 
= 1.2 
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Note that in the calculation for LR(Ti), the only part of the three 
I timing distributions that was actually used was the probability they 
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I assigned to day 1, the day on which E actually occurred. Thus, if another • 
jassessor gives the same probabilities to day 1 but differs with us about 
!the probabilities assigned to other days, the answer that the assessor ob-
jtains for LR(Ti) for this case will agree with ours. The reason for 
!assessing the entire distribution is that it provides a context for the one 
!evaluation that counts, the probability assigned to what actually happened. 
jLR(Ch): To evaluate this factor, we need to calculate the probability that 
Ian event of type Et persisted unabated for the duration of D-therapy given 
lthe hypotheses of drug and nondrug causation. Again, given the cause of E, 
I the information whose probability we need to assess is independent of the 
I information in Ti and Hi. 
Assuming that D caused E, M.S.K., based on his clinical experience, 
jassessed the probability that an event of type Et would last at least 9 
ldays, given that the event was an adverse reaction to D, as .7. 
Assuming that D did not cause E, we believed that whether M caused E or El 
1was coincidental to M, the distribution for time to resolution was the same. I 
IThis distribution was assessed by the pediatrician M.S.K. as follows: the 
jprobability that the diarrhea would end before 7 days is .60; in 7 days, .10;1 
tin 8 days, .08; in 9 days, .06; in 10 days, .OS; in 11 days, .04; and longer I 
!than 11 days, .07. Therefore, the probability that an event of type Et wouldl 
llast at least t~n days, given a nondrug cause, is .06 + .05 +.04 + .07 = .22 
LR(Ch) = 0.1 I .22 = 3.2 I 
I. 
~· 
. 
.• 
ILR(De): We need to calculate the probability that the diarrhea will resolve! 
!two days after dechallenge with D, given the hypotheses of drug and nondrug 
!causation and given that the diarrhea had persisted until the time of 
ldechallenge. These calculations are handled just as were the corresponding 
lones relative to the timing information. First, as explained in the 
(discussion of Ch, we decided that there would be no differences in our 
I distribution for the duration of the diarrhea whether it was caused by Mor 
(by a coincidental gastroenteritis. Using the distribution for duration of 
ldiarrhea above, conditioned to last at least~ days, the probabil~ty that 
ithe diarrhea would resolve within two days after dechallenge (ie., 10-11 
!days after onset) given nondrug causation, is (.OS+ .04) / .22 = .41. The 
ftime distribution for resolution given drug causation was judged by M.S.K. 
Jto be similar to the distribution for time of onset (see above). Con-
lsequently, the probability of resolution within 2 days of dechallenge was 
1estimated as .33 + .33 = .66. Thus: 
LR(De) = .66 / .41 = 1.6 
ILR(Re): Since no rechallenge occurred, this factor is equal to 1. 
L_ __________________ _J 
6. Calculating the Posterior Odds 
According to equation (1), to calculate the posterior odds 
in favor of D causation, we must multiply together the prior odds and - the 
likelihood ratio factors • 
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Posterior Odds: Application 
IA summary of the case analysis and the resulting posterior odds is shown in 
!Table 3. As shown, the posterior odds (obtained by multiplying the prior 
lodds by each of the likelihood ratio terms) is 8.85 and the posterior pro-
lbability of drug causation is .90. 
TABLE 3 GOES HERE 
Note that one of the strongest pieces of evidence was simply how long 
lthe diarrhea lasted before dechallenge occurred; had the amoxicillin been 
I immediately discontinued, the case for drug causation would have been far 
!less convincing -- and had in addition the drug been trimethoprim/sulfa-
lmethoxazole instead of amoxicillin, so that the prior odds in favor of drug 
lcausation would be substantially lower, the posterior odds would have 
lfavored a nondrug cause for the diarrhea. 
L------------------~ 
DISCUSSION 
The techniques for implementing the Bayesian approach described in this 
paper, which are based on the rules of probability theory, provide consider-
able help in doing an assessment al though they do not, as yet, constitute a 
standardized system. Nonetheless, they should allow an interested reader to 
use the approach, and the main characteristics of the Bayesian method should be 
clear. We believe that it provides a coherent framework for dealing with the 
multiple uncertainties and complexities of the causality assessment problem. 
Because it deals with the problem in all its "real world" uncertainty and com-
plexity, the Bayesian approach requires more in-depth analyses than other· 
methods and in its current form is not suitable for rapid filing of large 
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numbers of case reports. The extra time spent to use the Bayesian approach is 
amply justified however, when the answer to the individual causality 
assessment problem at hand really 11 matters 11 • Moreover, we believe that with 
further work it will be possible to standardize the approach and make it easy 
to use without sacrificing what we see as its essential correctness. 
In the first paper of this series [ 1] , we argued that the method meets 
criteria· that allow the consumer of an assessment to understand and believe 
the results in a way not possible with other methods. Similar features make 
the method attractive from the assessor's point of view. First, the method 
provides a way to incorporate all his ideas relevant to a particular causality 
assessment problem. Thus, in the example presented, ideas as different as the 
rate of diarrhea in an epidemiologic study, the increased risk of diarrhea in 
the winter months and in day-care attendees, the possibility that the diarrhea 
was caused by the patient's viral disease or was ··coincidental", and the 
probable duration of diarrhea from di£ ferent causes can all be incorporated 
and combined in a satisfying way. Second, by providing a logical framework 
for using the different sources of diagnostically useful information, the 
method allows the assessor to focus his attention on the elements of the 
evaluation, rather than on how they should be combined. This frequently 
allows important insights into the real significance of elements that might be 
ignored with other methods. The diagnostic importance of the duration of the 
diarrhea before dechallenge is an excellent example of this phenomenon in the 
case presented. Although it turns out to be important information dif-
ferentiating drug from non-drug cause, we completely-missed the significance 
of the duration of the diarrhea when we performed our first informal evalu-
ations of the case. 
Third, the method for combining the results allows easy identification of 
which elements drove the assessment. This allows the assessor to evaluate his 
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"confidence" in the final result very quickly. His overall confidence is 
primarily determined by his confidence in the few elements that drove the ~ 
assessment. This also makes further research to increase confidence much more 
efficient by allowing these activities to focus only on the "important" 
elements of the case. 
Finally, and most importantly, because the method follows logical rules 
for combining probabilities, it makes sense of this complex problem. Thus, 
rather than just accepting how the component assessments produce the final 
result, the assessor can understand why. This should allow him to learn much 
more effectively from such assessments than if he employed the "black box" of 
global introspection or the arbitrary scoring rules of the published stan-
dardized method (see [6] or [7], for instance). 
This unique '"explanatory" feature of the Bayesian approach can also be 
used to help understand a causality assessment result arrived at by any 
method. This can be achieved by reversing the direction of the Bayesian 
assessment: instead of estimating the prior odds and likelihood ratio terms 
and determining the posterior odds from them one can start with a posterior 
odds and determine what prior odds and likelihood ratio terms such a result 
would imply. More precisely, since all the component elements (including the 
posterior odds) are tied together mathematically any single term in the 
assessment can be inferred from a knowledge of the others. We believe that 
application of the Bayesian approach, either in the forward direction to 
assess causality, or in the reverse direction to learn what any given causa-
lity assessment result implies, should have widespread appiicability, not only 
in assessing adverse drug reactions, but in medical differential diagnosis in 
general. 
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TABLE 1 
Application of the Bayesian Approach: 
The Steps in the Analysis 
1. Identify the case "parameters" 
2. Collect the relevant case information 
3. Evaluate the prior odds 
4. Evaluate the likelihood ratio for History 
S. Evaluate the other likelihood ratio factors 
6. Calculate the posterior odds 
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TABLE 2 
Eliciting Case Information 
The assessor should answer each of the following questions. If he is 
unsure of the correct answer, he should state the grounds and extent of his 
uncertainty ( in probabilistic terms). While the answers to these questions 
will provide all 
additional case 
of the relevant case information for many cases, any 
information that can help differentiate between drug and 
nondrug etiological candidates in a particular case under review should also 
be noted in the appropriate chronological period. 
1. Hi: 
2. 
a. Has the patient taken Dor similar drugs before? How frequently? On 
how many of these occasions did he experience an event of type Et or 
another possible adverse reaction? Describe, if different from Et• 
b. How frequently has the patient previously experienced events of type 
Et without exposure to Dor related drugs? 
c. Are there are attributes of the patient that place him at special risk 
to events of type Et from any cause? If so, what are they, and from 
which causes is he at special risk? 
Ti: When in relation to the course of D-therapy did the patient 
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experience the event E? If available, give the time-course of all pro-~ 
dromal events. 
.. 
-~-
6 3. 
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Ch: 
a. Are there any data about levels of Din tissues or body fluids during 
the time the patient experienced E? If so, what are they? 
b. Are there any distinctive details in clinical presentation, laboratory 
results, pathological findings, or duration that can help differentially 
diagnose the cause of E? If so, what are they? 
c. Did the symptoms of E abate before dechallenge occurred? If so, how 
long after the time of onset of E? 
4. De: 
a. Was D discontinued or its dosage reduced after the onset of E? If so, 
describe how and when. 
b. If dechallenge occurred, did the manifestations of E abate? If so, to 
what extent and when? 
c. Were the manifestations · of E treated directly? 
anatagonist to D administered? What was the result? 
Was a specific 
s. Re: 
a. If dechallenge occurred, was the patient subsequently rechallenged 
with D? If so, when and in what dosage? 
b. If rechallenge occurred, did the manifestations of E recur? If so, to 
what extent and when? 
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Term Assessed 
Prior 
History (Hi) 
Timing (Ti) 
Characteristics (Ch) 
Dechallenge (De) 
Rechallenge (Re) 
TABLE 3 
Summary of Results 
Odds 
4.0 
.36 
1.2 
3.2 
1.6 
1.0 
Cumulative 
Odds 
4.0 
1.44 
1.73 
5.53 
8.85 
POSTERIOR ODDS IN FAVOUR OF DRUG CAUSATION = 8.85 
POSTERIOR PROBABILITY IN FAVOUR OF DRUG CAUSATION= .90 
Cumulative 
Probability 
.so 
.59 
.63 
.85 
.90 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix I: The Law of Total Probability 
Suppose Ai, A2, •••• An are mutually contradictory propositions such that 
one of them must be true. Then for any proposition C, the Law of Total 
Probability states that: 
P(C IB) = [P(C fB ·and Ai) ·x P(A1 IB)] + ••••• + [P(CiB and An) x P)(An IB)] 
The Law of Total Probability is derived as follows. First, since the 
propositions A1,••••,An are mutually contradictory and one of them is true, 
C = (C and Ai) or (C and A2) or ••• (C and An). 
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By the additivity condition, which obviously extends to n mutually contra- '"' 
dictory propositions, 
P(CIB) = P(C and Ai IB) + ••• + P(C and AnlB) 
Now apply the multiplicative condition (see Appendix I in [l]) to each term on 
the right: 
; 
; 
. ... 
; 
• 
·. 
Appendix II: Predictive Probability and the .. True"' Incidence 
A probability distribution for the "'true" incidence gives values for the 
assessor's probabilities P(a ~ ·true· incidence -' b), for all a and b 
between O and 1. A distribution is usually specified by means of a density 
function, a nonnegative function f defined on the interval (0,1), such that 
P( a , • true· incidence , b) is obtained as the area under the graph of f 
between a and b (The total area under the graph off is 1). 
The tactic discussed in Section B under "Evaluating the Prior Odds" 
derives from the following theorem, due to de Finetti: 
Suppose x1 , x2 ••• is a sequence of (0,1)-valued random variables, whose 
distribution is invariant under any reordering of the variables. Then 
(1) P(X1 = 1) = J [0,1] y dG{y), 
where G is the distribution function for the random variable Y and 
(It is a conclusion of the theorem that this limit exists.) 
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The expression on the right of equation (1) is called the mean of the distri-
bution G. If G has a density function g, then 
To interpret the theorem in the context of this paper, Xi, x2 , ••• 
represents a sequence of future patients with clinical condition M who, say, 
are to receive a specified course of D-therapy and of whom nothing additional 
is known (that is, "generic" patients with the two stated properties). 
Because of their "genericness", the assessor's probability distribution for 
which of these patients will experience an event of type Et does not depend on 
their labelling, so the theorem applies. Y represents the "true" incidence. 
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Thus, the theorem implies that if the assessor evaluates his distribution G .-. 
for the •• true"' incidence, his pre4ictive probability that the next patient 
will experience an event of type Et (that is, that X1=l), or P(Et D), is just 
the mean of the distribution G. 
.. -
;; 
. 
-
.· 
.. 
.. :~ 
.. _ 
11 
D 
ll. 
Appendix III: To a coherent evaluator, the posterior odds does not depend on 
the time horizon 
The time horizon adds an additional conditioning proposition to all the 
probabilities calculated in a casuality assessment: that the event E occurs 
in a specified time interval - say T - initiated by administration of the 
drug D. Refer to this proposition as ·• E in T... Now as long as the actual 
time that E occurred, say t, is in the interval T, then any probability 
already calculated conditionally on case information C which includes the 
proposition "'E at t" - is unaffected by also conditioning on "E in T", which 
adds no new information. In particular, the probabilities that appear as the 
numerator and denominator of the posterior odds are conditional on C and hence 
on "'E at t", and so are unaffected by the time horizon, so lon~ as t is in the 
time horizon interval T • 
It is of interest to see how the other terms that are evaluated in a 
causality assessment depend on the time horizon. For convenience, suppose 
there is no information in Hi (that is, all Hi information is already included 
in B, as specification of M). Then, the only terms affected by the time 
horizon are the prior odds and the likelihood ratio for timing, since all 
subsequent likelihood ratio terms are calculated conditionally on Ti, that is, 
on "Eat t"'. 
Using Bayes' Theorem, the following relation can be shown to be true: 
1) P(D--+EIB, E in T) 
P(D-,t+EIB, E in T) 
P(D-_.EI B) 
P(D;4EI B) 
X 
P(E in TIB, D----E) 
P(E in ti B, o.,4E) 
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That is, the prior odds calculated with the time horizon Tis the product of 
the prior odds without the time horizon, multiplied by another factor that 
derives from the timing distribution for the event, with and without drug 
causation. 
Similarly, the likelihood ratio for timing can be written: 
(2) LR(Ti) 
= 
P(E at tlB,D--+-E, E in T) 
P(E at t)B,D~E, E in T) 
Using the multiplication law the numerator of this expression can be 
rewritten as: P(E at tlB,D-+E) x P(E in T(E at t, B,D--+E) / P(E in T1B, D--+-
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E). So long as we choose the time horizon (E in T) to be longer than the 
actual time interval of occurrence (Eat t) then the expression P(E in TIE at 
t,B,D-+E) = 1. Thus the numerator of (2) becomes: P(E at t)B,~E) / P(E • ~~ 
in T IB,D--+E) 
Applying the same logic to the numerator and denominator of the likelihood 
ratio for timing we get: 
(3) LR(Ti) P(E at tlB,D-+E) / P(E in TIB,D--+E) 
= 
P(E at tlB,Jn4E) / P(E in TIB,~E) 
P(E at tlB,D--.E) P(E in TIB,D~E) 
= X 
P(E at tlB,D~E) P(E in Tl B,D-+E) 
• 
• 
0 
' 
That is, the likelihood ratio for timing with the time horizon T is the 
product of the likelihood ratio for timing without the time horizon, 
multiplied by a factor that is the reciprocal of the factor appearing on the 
right hand side of equation (1). Multiplying the left and right-hand sides, 
respectively, of equations (1) and (2) shows that the product of the prior 
odds and LR(Ti) remains the same, with and without any time horizon T that 
contains the actual occurrence time t. 
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